

**Steven Crowell and Jeff Malpas, Editors. *Transcendental
Heidegger*
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Transcendental Heidegger editors Steven Crowell and Jeff Malpas believe more attention should be paid to the transcendental in Heidegger's philosophy, particularly in relation to Kant and Husserl. Their collection of articles – edited versions of papers delivered at the Heidegger and Transcendental Philosophy conference held at Rice University in 2003 – is an attempt to rectify this gap. Despite Heidegger's overt rejection of the transcendental in his later work, Crowell and Malpas argue that the definition of 'transcendental' is open enough to interpretation to allow for a broader understanding of the term than Heidegger's. Their collection of articles brings together heavyweights of Heidegger studies to explore the transcendental as *a priori*, intentionality, the grounding role of Dasein and the conditions of historicity and truthfulness.

These dense and sometimes overly detailed contributions are for the most part convincingly argued and clear, but the organisation of the book alphabetically by author rather than by theme is a mistake, as the relations among articles that share questions and argue with and against each other are not immediately apparent. Only upon revisiting the articles with the intention to write this review did I begin to get a sense of the major themes inhabiting this collection – those of historicity and intentionality. For example, William Blattner's argument for a pragmatic distinction within Heidegger's ontological reasoning between understanding as pre-cognitive, pre-conceptual, pre-propositional and interpretative as the articulation of the as-structure ends with the proposition that Heidegger's love of poetry stems from its nature as evocative rather than conceptual. This late reference to

poetry would have led nicely into Karsten Harries' survey of Heidegger's work, which concludes that, for Heidegger, poetry expresses authenticity as an experience of free self-possession, or of transcendence. Instead, Blattner's contribution is followed by David Carr's essay proposing that Heidegger's reading of Kant is Husserlian. Though Carr, like Blattner, understands Heidegger's transcendentalism to be of a different order than empiricism, the thematic of Heidegger's relation to Husserlian phenomenology would have been more apparent if Carr's essay was positioned with Dermot Moran's contribution, which also argues for a Husserlian reading of Heidegger.

While Carr focuses on Heidegger's determination of Kant's apperception as transcendental but not deductive, Moran poses Heidegger's interest in the 'Being-question' against Husserl's transcendental phenomenology, which fails to resolve how humans can be both entities in the world and entities that constitute the world. Heidegger resolves the problem, Moran suggests, by replacing Husserl's modal (subjective/objective) split into an onto-ontological split, restoring everything that is existential to Dasein to Husserl's natural modality. Rachel Zuckert also focuses on a Heideggerian reconceptualisation of a philosophical split as a foundational difference. For her, Heidegger rejects the Kantian conception of both determinative and reflective judgements being required to constitute experience. Heidegger's position, Zuckert argues, is that only reflective judgement, which does not separate self-conception from objects, is required to apprehend contingent order.

The randomness of argument generated by the contingent organisation of alphabeticisation does not allow for the clear emergence of a linear flow of implications that begins with intentionality and ends with the nature of Dasein's experience of truth, whether that be existentially, historically, ethically or inauthentically. Both Mark Okrent and Steven Crowell discuss Heidegger's understanding of intentionality and its relation to language, arguing for an understanding of Heideggerian intention as exteriority. Okrent focuses on Heidegger's replacement of Kant's necessity of conceptual representation with intentional assertion, which forms the transcendental condition of the 'I think' through the nature of Being-in-the-world and equipmentality as towards the external. Crowell argues for a different reconception of Kant, locating intentionality in the normativity of practice rather than in transcendental logic. For Okrent, Heidegger's reworking of Kant does not sufficiently prove the priority of intentionality to judgement and he suggests, rather, that Dasein's use of language is the basis for its ability to make judgements about being-in-the-world. Crowell, in essence, argues this from an ethical standpoint, conceiving discourse as that which

makes it possible for Dasein to reasonably account for the ground of its own actions, which is Dasein's freedom and conscience.

Robert B Pippin also looks at the problematic nature of Dasein's requirement to serve as its own ground of meaning, recognising Heidegger's identification of the collapse of meaning, experienced as *Angst*, that sometimes results as disproving ontological transcendence. Herman Philipse agrees that *Angst* expresses the failure of things to have pre-existing significance, but argues that Dasein's ability to interpret objects inauthentically indicates Heidegger's transcendental realism in regard to entities. Such realism acknowledges that Dasein's ability to discourse about entities as there or not there is separate from their actual being, which is transcendently ideal.

Whereas Okrent, Crowell, Philipse and Pippin focus on the implications of Dasein's requirement to make its own meaning, William Blattner, Cristina La Font and John Haugeland focus on what the empiricism of science means for truth. While Blattner concludes that Heidegger does not offer sufficient justification that science-specific ontologies are *a priori* disclosable – thus philosophical – La Font and Haugeland argue that temporality is problematic when used as a basis for scientific truth. La Font proposes Hilary Putnam's conception of the contextual *a priori* as a resolution to the problem of understanding as both factual (historical) and true and concludes that Heidegger's relativising of objects in relation to understanding allows for meaning to determine reference, and truth to depend on meaning. La Font questions how any *a priori* knowledge can be universally valid if there is no absolute truth across incommensurable understandings. Haugeland asks a similar question, exploring the logic of the existence of objects before the scientific laws that make them true have been conceptualised and after they have changed, specifically objects under Newtonian and then Einstein's physics. Haugeland effectively resolves the problem by relativising knowledge rather than objects, proposing Newton's space-time as different than Einstein's, and therefore giving entities continuity of being within each notion of time.

Science, pragmatism and discourse can all lead to a sense of truth as historical rather than universal. Daniel Dahlstrom and Jeff Malpas historicise Heidegger's definition of being. Dahlstrom writes that truth should be understood as 'prevailing', which Heidegger only ever uses in relation to being and truth but not to entities. This sense of extended truth as external to and following from entities understands being as revealed and concealed in the historical event that grounds truth as correspondence. For Malpas, being as an event that realises meaning is only fully realised after Heidegger's Turning, which is a relocation of truth from subject to place, a substi-

tution of topology for structure, which makes truth no longer a transcendental act of the subject but *aletheia* as revealed by the world through Da-Sein's existence in an open place of betweenness that unites and differentiates so that the world can disclose itself to Da-Sein as history.

Transcendental Heidegger successfully declares the multiplicity of ways 'transcendental' can be understood, especially in regard to Heidegger's philosophy. Those, such as Philipse, who argue for Heidegger's transcendentalism do so just as convincingly as those, like Pippin, who argue against it. Heidegger is both transcendental and not, depending upon how transcendentalism is understood – as an *a priori* ground for meaning or as the character of the relation of Dasein to the world. Whether or not conceived as transcendental, Heidegger emerges as a philosopher who fundamentally rethinks the relation by which Dasein attributes being to objects and freedom to itself, a relation located in Dasein's intentionality.

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